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Moreover, the survey contains information on the three friendship network characteristics we consider in this study: (1) the. Vessel Information. Allgemein. Imo: Name: FRIENDSHIP. Vessel Type - Generic: Dredger. Vessel Type - Detailed: Salvage/Rescue Vessel. The Club is to help ease the integration into the local community in the form of meetings, discussions, the sharing of information and providing friendship and. Making a hundred friends is not a miracle. More information Saved by 20 Funny And Wonderful Friendship Quotes Send to your best mermaid or merman! Friendship ist eine Town im Knox County des Bundesstaates Maine in den Vereinigten Staaten Friendship im Geographic Names Information System des United States Geological Survey, abgerufen am September

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Nov 16, - Keychain with friendship message, the key ring is additionally decorated with a heart on a small carabiner. ❤ Our followers More information. Moreover, the survey contains information on the three friendship network characteristics we consider in this study: (1) the. Friendship ist eine Town im Knox County des Bundesstaates Maine in den Vereinigten Staaten Friendship im Geographic Names Information System des United States Geological Survey, abgerufen am September Monica und Chandler ziehen zusammen, weshalb Rachel zu Phoebe zieht. Daraufhin macht Joey mit ihr Schluss und Chandler kommt mit ihr zusammen. Erst bei der Geburt stellt Online Slots With No Deposit heraus, dass sie Zwillinge bekommt, die sie Jack und Erica nennen. Rachel nimmt ein Michael Jackson Casino in Paris an, entscheidet sich aber im Flugzeug noch dazu, in New York zu bleiben und einen Neuanfang mit Ross zu wagen. Auch von Kathy, seiner Schauspielkollegin in der vierten Staffel, wird er verlassen, da sie und Slot Machine Cheat sich verliebt haben. Sie wird jedoch den Sohn Ben mit ihrer Lebensgefährtin Susan erziehen. Insgesamt wurde die Serie mal für den Emmy nominiert. Susan ist Book Of Ra Ingyen Online Lebensgefährtin, sie und Ross verbindet eine beiderseitige Antipathie, die sie nur selten zu überwinden schaffen. Es ist immer zwanghaft ordentlich Slot O Pol Monica kann es nicht ausstehen, wenn irgendein Möbelstück verrückt wird. Doch taucht Mike in diesem Moment auf, da Monica und Chandler ihn von Davids Plänen berichtet haben, und Phoebe entscheidet sich letztlich für ihn, da sie — wie Monica und Chandler ahnten — Mike immer noch liebt. Diese drei misslungenen Ehen, sorgen dafür, dass Ross während der Serie viele Witze auf seine Kosten über Spanischer Markt ergehen lassen musste und, dass sein Umgang mit dem weiblichen Geschlecht noch unsicherer und verkrampfter wurde. In der ersten Folge erfährt der Zuschauer, dass Carol an diesem Tag ihre Sachen aus der gemeinsamen Wohnung abgeholt hat, da sie lesbisch ist und sich von Ross getrennt hat. Monica und Chandler versuchen, ein Kind zu zeugen. Nach der Scheidung seiner Eltern hat er stark zu rauchen begonnen, dann jedoch wieder aufgehört.

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Rachel stellt den attraktiven Assistenten Tag ein, mit dem sie eine Affäre beginnt. In der neunten Staffel lernt sie durch ein Blind Date Mike kennen, mit dem sie in der gleichen Staffel noch zusammenziehen will. Sie werden — zunächst auf einem Missverständnis beruhend — von der werdenden Mutter Erica auserwählt, die Eltern ihrer ungeborenen Zwillinge zu sein. Doch taucht Mike in diesem Moment auf, da Monica und Chandler ihn von Davids Plänen berichtet haben, und Phoebe entscheidet sich letztlich für ihn, da sie — wie Monica und Chandler ahnten — Mike immer noch liebt. Im Februar wurde bestätigt, dass zum Start der Streamingplattform HBO Max im Mai eine einmalige Folge produziert wird, bei der alle sechs Hauptdarsteller wieder dabei sein werden. Rachel löst versehentlich ein Feuer in dieser Wohnung aus, und deshalb muss Phoebe als Gast bei Monica wohnen.

Friendships emerge, Helm claims, when the friends form a plural agent that cares positively about their relationship, and the variety of kinds of friendships there can be, including friendships of pleasure, utility, and virtue, are to be understood in terms of the particular way in which they jointly understand their relationship to be something they care about—as tennis buddies or as life partners, for example.

Friendship clearly plays an important role in our lives; to a large extent, the various accounts of friendship aim at identifying and clarifying that role.

In this context, it is important to understand not only why friendship can be valuable, but also what justifies particular friendships.

What makes friendship worthwhile for me, and so how ought I to evaluate whether particular friendships I have are good friendships or not?

One sort of answer is that friendship is instrumentally good. Moreover, she claims, friendship is pleasant in itself as well as useful to the friends.

Annis adds that it helps promote self-esteem, which is good both instrumentally and for its own sake. Cooper b , interpreting Aristotle, provides two arguments for why this might be so.

Hence, a flourishing life is possible only through the epistemic access friendship provides. Such activities include moral and intellectual activities, activities in which it is often difficult to sustain interest without being tempted to act otherwise.

Friendship, and the shared values and shared activities it essentially involves, is needed to reinforce our intellectual and practical understanding of such activities as worthwhile in spite of their difficulty and the ever present possibility that our interest in pursuing them will flag.

Consequently, the shared activity of friendship is partly constitutive of human flourishing. So far these are attempts to understand the value of friendship to the individual in terms of the way friendship contributes, instrumentally or constitutively, to something else that is valuable to the individual.

Yet one might also think that friendship is valuable for its own sake. Indeed, we ought to expect that fleshing out this claim would involve a substantive proposal concerning the nature of that community and how it can have a separate federated?

Friedman existence and value. Once again, the literature on shared intention and plural subjecthood is relevant here; see, for example, Gilbert , , ; Tuomela , ; Searle ; and Bratman A question closely related to this question of the value of friendship is that of what justifies my being friends with this person rather than with someone else or no one at all.

To a certain extent, answers to the question of the value of friendship might seem to provide answers to the question of the justification of friendship.

After all, if the value of friendship in general lies in the way it contributes either instrumentally or constitutively to a flourishing life for me, then it might seem that I can justify particular friendships in light of the extent to which they contribute to my flourishing.

Nonetheless, this seems unacceptable because it suggests—what is surely false—that friends are fungible.

To be fungible is to be replaceable by a relevantly similar object without any loss of value. That is, if my friend has certain properties including, perhaps, relational properties in virtue of which I am justified in having her as my friend because it is in virtue of those properties that she contributes to my flourishing , then on this view I would be equally justified in being friends with anyone else having relevantly similar properties, and so I would have no reason not to replace my current friend with someone else of this sort.

This is surely objectionable as an understanding of friendship. In solving this problem of fungibility, philosophers have typically focused on features of the historical relationship of friendship cf.

Brink , quoted above. If my friend and I form a kind of union in virtue of our having a shared conception of how to live that is forged and maintained through a particular history of interaction and sharing of our lives, and if my sense of my values and identity therefore depends on these being most fundamentally our values and identity, then it is simply not possible to substitute another person for my friend without loss.

For this other person could not possibly share the relevant properties of my friend, namely her historical relationship with me.

However, the price of this solution to the problem of fungibility, as it arises both for friendship and for love, is the worry about autonomy raised towards the end of Section 1.

An alternative solution is to understand these historical, relational properties of my friend to be more directly relevant to the justification of our friendship.

Thus, Whiting distinguishes the reasons we have for initiating a friendship which are, she thinks, impersonal in a way that allows for fungibility from the reasons we have for sustaining a friendship; the latter, she suggests, are to be found in the history of concern we have for each other.

However, it is unclear how the historical-relational properties can provide any additional justification for friendship beyond that provided by thinking about the value of friendship in general, which does not solve the fungibility problem.

It is not clear how the appeal to historical properties of my friend or our friendship can provide an answer. In part the trouble here arises from tacit preconceptions concerning the nature of justification.

Solving the problem, it might therefore seem, requires somehow overcoming this preconception concerning justification—a task which no one has attempted in the literature on friendship.

For further discussion of this problem of fungibility as it arises in the context of love, as well as discussion of a related problem concerning whether the object rather than the grounds of love is a particular person or a type of person, see Section 6 of the entry on love.

Another way to construe the question of the value of friendship is in more social terms: what is the good to society of having its members engaged in relationships of friendship?

For similar claims, see Annis These answers to the social value of friendship seem to apply equally well to love: insofar as love essentially involves both a concern for your beloved for his sake and, consequently, action on his behalf for his sake, love will exhibit the same social value.

Friedman , however, argues that friendship itself is socially valuable in a way that love is not. Understanding the intimacy of friendship in terms of the sharing of values, Friedman notes that friendship can involve the mutual support of, in particular, unconventional values, which can be an important stimulus to moral progress within a community.

Consequently, the institution of friendship is valuable not just to the individuals but also to the community as a whole.

A growing body of research since the mids questions the relationship between the phenomenon of friendship and particular moral theories.

At the root of these questions concerning the relationship between friendship and morality is the idea that friendship involves special duties : duties for specific people that arise out of the relationship of friendship.

Thus, it seems that we have obligations to aid and support our friends that go well beyond those we have to help strangers because they are our friends, much like we parents have special duties to aid and support our children because they are our children.

Given this, the question arises as to what the relationship is between such special duties of friendship and other duties, in particular moral duties: can our obligations to our friends sometimes trump our moral duties, or must we always subordinate our personal relationships to morality in order to be properly impartial as, it might be thought, morality demands?

Such moral schizophrenia, Stocker argues, prevents us in general from harmonizing our moral reasons and our motives, and it does so in a way that destroys the very possibility of our having and sustaining friendships with others.

Given the manifest value of friendship in our lives, this is clearly a serious problem with these moral theories. What is it about friendship that generates these problems?

One concern arises out of the teleological conception of action , implicit in consequentialism, according to which actions are understood in terms of their ends or purposes.

The trouble is, Stocker argues, the characteristic actions of friendship cannot be understood in this way. To be a friend is at least sometimes to be motivated to act out of a concern for your friend as this individual cf.

Section 1. That is, actions done out of friendship are essentially actions motivated by a special sort of concern—a concern for this particular person—which is in part a matter of having settled habits of response to the friend.

This, Stocker concludes, is a kind of motivation for action that a teleological conception of action cannot countenance, resulting in moral schizophrenia.

Jeske argues for a somewhat different conclusion: that in order to heal this apparent split between impartial moral obligations and the partial obligations of friendship, we must abandon the distinction between moral and nonmoral obligations.

Stocker raises another, more general concern for consequentialism and deontology arising out of a conception of friendship.

Consequently, either act consequentialists must exhibit moral schizophrenia, or, to avoid it, they must understand consequentialist reasons for action to be our motives.

However, because such consequentialist reasons are impersonal, taking this latter tack would be to leave out the kind of reasons and motives that are central to friendship, thereby undermining the very institution of friendship.

The same is true, Stocker argues, of rule consequentialism the view that actions are right if they follow principles or rules that tend to result in the most good overall, impersonally conceived—see the entry on rule-consequentialism and on deontology the view that actions are right just in case they are in accordance with certain rules or principles that are binding on all moral agents.

If we are to avoid moral schizophrenia and embody this reason in our motives for action, we could not, then, act out of friendship—out of a concern for our friends for their sakes.

This means that any rule consequentialist or deontologist that avoids moral schizophrenia can act so as to benefit her friends, but such actions would be merely as if friendly, not genuinely friendly, and she could not therefore have and sustain genuine friendships.

The only alternative is to split her moral reasons and her motives for friendly acts, thereby becoming schizophrenic. For some discussion about whether such moral schizophrenia really is as bad as Stocker thinks, see Woodcock Blum portions of which are reprinted with slight modifications in Blum and Friedman , pick up on this contrast between the impartiality of consequentialism and deontology and the inherent partiality of friendship, and argue more directly for a rejection of such moral theories.

Consequently, they argue, these impartialist moral theories must understand friendship to be inherently biased and therefore not to be inherently moral.

It is this claim that Blum and Friedman deny: although such universalist concern surely has a place in moral theory, the value—indeed the moral value cf.

Section 2. Thus, they claim, insofar as consequentialism and deontology are unable to acknowledge the moral value of friendship, they cannot be adequate moral theories and ought to be rejected in favor of some alternative.

See Mason for further elaborations of this argument, and see Sadler for an alternative response. Subjective consequentialism is the view that whenever we face a choice of actions, we should both morally justify a particular course of action and be motivated to act accordingly directly by the relevant consequentialist principle whether what that principle assesses are particular actions or rules for action.

Clearly, Stocker, Blum, and Friedman are right to think that subjective consequentialism cannot properly accommodate the motives of friendship.

This means that the objective consequentialist can properly acknowledge that sometimes the best states of affairs result not just from undertaking certain behaviors, but from undertaking them with certain motives, including motives that are essentially personal.

In particular, Railton argues, the world would be a better place if each of us had dispositions to act so as to benefit our friends out of a concern for their good and not the general good.

So, on consequentialist grounds each of us has moral reasons to inculcate such a disposition to friendliness, and when the moment arrives that disposition will be engaged, so that we are motivated to act out of a concern for our friends rather than out of an impersonal, impartial concern for the greater good.

So the friendship critique of Stocker, Blum, and Friedman fails. However, Badhwar argues, the value of friendship is something we can appreciate only from a personal point of view, so that the moral rightness of friendly actions must be assessed only by appeal to an essentially personal relationship in which we act for the sake of our friends and not for the sake of producing the most good in general and in indifference to this particular personal relationship.

Therefore, sophisticated consequentialism, because of its impersonal nature, blinds us to the value of particular friendships and the moral reasons they provide for acting out of friendship, all of which can be properly appreciated only from the personal point of view.

In so doing, sophisticated consequentialism undermines what is distinctive about friendship as such. The trouble once again is a split between consequentialist reasons and friendly motivations: a kind of moral schizophrenia.

At this point it might seem that the proper consequentialist reply to this line of criticism is to refuse to accept the claim that a moral justification of the value of friendship and friendly actions must be personal: the good of friendship and the good that friendly actions promote, a consequentialist should say, are things we must be able to understand in impersonal terms or they would not enter into a properly moral justification of the rightness of action.

Because sophisticated consequentialists agree that motivation out of friendship must be personal, they must reject the idea that the ultimate moral reasons for acting in these cases are your motives, thereby rejecting the relatively weak motivational internalism that is implicit in the friendship critique for weak motivational internalism, see the entry on moral cognitivism vs.

This means that the debate at issue in the friendship critique of consequentialism needs to be carried on in part at the level of a discussion of the nature of motivation and the connection between moral reasons and motives.

Indeed, such a discussion has implications for how we should construe the sort of mutual caring that is central to friendship.

For the sophisticated consequentialist would presumably try to spell out that mutual caring in terms of friendly dispositions motives divorced from consequentialist reasons , an attempt which advocates of the friendship critique would say involves insufficient attention to the particular person one cares about, insofar as the caring would not be justified by who she is motives informed by personal reasons.

The discussion of friendship and moral theories has so far concentrated on the nature of practical reason. A similar debate focuses on the nature of value.

Scanlon uses friendship to argue against what he calls teleological conceptions of values presupposed by consequentialism.

The teleological view understands states of affairs to have intrinsic value, and our recognition of such value provides us with reasons to bring such states of affairs into existence and to sustain and promote them.

Scanlon argues that friendship involves kinds of reasons—of loyalty, for example—are not teleological in this way, and so the value of friendship does not fit into the teleological conception and so cannot be properly recognized by consequentialism.

In responding to this argument, Hurka argues that this argument presupposes a conception of the value of friendship as something we ought to respect as well as to promote that is at odds with the teleological conception of value and so with teleological conceptions of friendship.

Consequently, the debate must shift to the more general question about the nature of value and cannot be carried out simply by attending to friendship.

These conclusions that we must turn to broader issues if we are to settle the place friendship has in morality reveal that in one sense the friendship critique has failed: it has not succeeded in making an end run around traditional debates between consequentialists, deontologists, and virtue theorists.

Yet in a larger sense it has succeeded: it has forced these moral theories to take personal relationships seriously and consequently to refine and complicate their accounts in the process.

Aristotle, General Topics: ethics character, moral cognitivism vs. Nature of Friendship 1. Value and Justification of Friendship 2.

The Nature of Friendship Friendship essentially involves a distinctive kind of concern for your friend, a concern which might reasonably be understood as a kind of love.

At best it is the sharing of what friends care about that is relevant here. Through mutual decisions about specific practical matters, friends begin to express that shared commitment….

Any happiness or disappointment that follows from these actions belongs to both persons, for the decision to so act was joint and the responsibility is thus shared.

Value and Justification of Friendship Friendship clearly plays an important role in our lives; to a large extent, the various accounts of friendship aim at identifying and clarifying that role.

Friendship and Moral Theory A growing body of research since the mids questions the relationship between the phenomenon of friendship and particular moral theories.

As a non-schizophrenic, un-selfdeceived consequentialist friend, however, she must put the two thoughts together.

And the two thoughts are logically incompatible. Bibliography Alfano, M. Masala and J. Webber eds. Annas, J. Annis, D. Badhwar, N. LaFollette ed.

Blum, L. Bratman, M. Brink, D. Card, R. Cocking, D. Collins, S. Conee, E. Cooper, J. Friedman, M. Grunebaum, J. Gilbert, M. Helm, B.

Hoffman, E. Hurka, T. Jeske, D. Kawall, J. Keller, S. Koltonski, D. Older adults continue to report high levels of personal satisfaction in their friendships as they age, even as the overall number of friends tends to decline.

This satisfaction is associated with an increased ability to accomplish activities of daily living , as well as a reduced decline in cognitive abilities , decreased instances of hospitalization, and better outcomes related to rehabilitation.

Research within the past four decades has now consistently found that older adults reporting the highest levels of happiness and general well being also report strong, close ties to numerous friends.

As family responsibilities and vocational pressures lessen, friendships become more important. Among the elderly, friendships can provide links to the larger community, serve as a protective factor against depression and loneliness, and compensate for potential losses in social support previously given by family members.

Additionally, older adults in declining health who remain in contact with friends show improved psychological well-being. Children with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder ADHD may have difficulty forming and maintaining friendships, due to a limited ability to build social skills through observational learning , difficulties attending to social cues , and because of the social impacts of impulsive behavior and a greater tendency to engage in behavior that may be seen as disruptive by their peers.

Certain symptoms of autism spectrum disorders can interfere with the formation of interpersonal relations, such as a preference for routine actions, resistance to change, obsession with particular interests or rituals, and a lack of social skills.

Children with autism have been found to be more likely to be close friends of one person, rather than having groups of friends.

Additionally, they are more likely to be close friends of other children with some sort of a disability. A study done by Frankel et al.

Paraprofessionals, specifically one-on-one aides and classroom aides, are often placed with children with autism spectrum disorders in order to facilitate friendships and guide the child in making and maintaining substantial friendships.

Although lessons and training may help peers of children with autism, bullying is still a major concern in social situations.

According to Anahad O'Connor of The New York Times , bullying is most likely to occur against children with autism spectrum disorders who have the most potential to live independently.

Such children are more at risk because they have as many of the rituals and lack of social skills as children with lower-functioning more obvious autism, but they are more likely to be mainstreamed in school, since they are on the higher-functioning less obvious end of the autism spectrum.

Children with autism have more difficulty attending to social cues , and so may not always recognize when they are being bullied.

Children with Down syndrome have increased difficulty forming friendships. They experience a language delay causing them to have a harder time playing with other children.

Most children with Down syndrome may prefer to watch other students and play alongside a friend but not with them, mostly because they understand more than they can outwardly express.

In preschool years, children with Down syndrome can benefit from the classroom setting, surrounded by other children and less dependent on adult aid.

Children with this disability benefit from a variety of interactions with both adults and children. At school, ensuring an inclusive environment in the classroom can be difficult, but proximity to close friends can be crucial for social development.

Studies have found that strong social supports improve a person's prospects for good health and longevity. Conversely, loneliness and a lack of social supports have been linked to an increased risk of heart disease , viral infections , and cancer , as well as higher mortality rates overall.

Two researchers have even termed friendship networks a "behavioral vaccine " that boosts both physical and mental health.

There is a large body of research linking friendship and health, but the precise reasons for the connection remain unclear.

Most of the studies in this area are large prospective studies that follow people over time, and while there may be a correlation between the two variables friendship and health status , researchers still do not know if there is a cause and effect relationship, such as the notion that good friendships actually improve health.

A number of theories have attempted to explain this link. These theories have included that good friends encourage their friends to lead more healthy lifestyles; that good friends encourage their friends to seek help and access services when needed; that good friends enhance their friends' coping skills in dealing with illness and other health problems; and that good friends actually affect physiological pathways that are protective of health.

The lack of friendship has been found to play a role in increasing risk of suicidal ideation among female adolescents, including having more friends who were not themselves friends with one another.

However, no similar effect was observed for males. Higher friendship quality directly contributes to self-esteem, self-confidence, and social development.

The dissolution of a friendship may be viewed as a personal rejection, or may be the result of natural changes over time, as friends grow more distant both physically and emotionally.

The disruption of friendships has been associated with increased guilt , anger and depression , and may be highly stressful events, especially in childhood.

However, potential negative effects can be mitigated if the dissolution of a friendship is replaced with another close relationship.

Friends tend to be more similar to one another in terms of age, gender, behavior, substance abuse , personal disposition, and academic performance.

In general, female-female friendship interactions among children tend to be more focused on interpersonal connections and mutual support , while male-male interaction tends to be more focused on social status , and may actively discourage the expression of emotional needs.

Nevertheless, males and females tend to report comparative levels of satisfaction with their friendships. Among older adults, women tend to be more socially adept than their male peers, and many older men may rely upon a female companion, such as a spouse, in order to compensate for their comparative lack of social skills.

Friendship is found among animals of higher intelligence, such as higher mammals and some birds. Cross-species friendships are common between humans and domestic animals.

Cross-species friendships may also occur between two non-human animals, such as dogs and cats. From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.

Mutual affection between people. For other uses, see Friend disambiguation , Friends disambiguation , and Friendship disambiguation.

For the album, see Friendliness album. Types of love. Social views. Color wheel theory of love Biological basis Love letter Love magic Valentine's Day Philosophy Religious views love deities Mere-exposure effect Similarity Physical attractiveness Triangular theory of love.

See also: Ethology , Altruism in animals , and Sociobiology. Oxford Dictionaries. Oxford Dictionary Press. Retrieved 25 May Gavin An Introduction to Developmental Psychology.

Retrieved 26 September OUP US. Stanford, CT. Retrieved 21 June New York: Little, Brown. Academic Press: New York.

Information About Friendship When proximity is spatially impossible, the attraction manifests itself by the one's turning his thoughts and desires to the other. Prior to the nineteenth century, boys spent more time in the company of adults than with their peers. Information About Friendship these qualities you can truly enjoy the bliss of friendship. The connection between friendship activity and psychological well-being is one of the most frequently Win7 Bat findings in the social Vier Elemente Spiel literature. King Spiele App through people you've interacted with — even very casually — who made a positive impression. Such contextual factors influence the number and specific Meilleure Strategie Keno of friendships an individual has the opportunity and personal resources to form and maintain. In addition to the studies of what people think about their friends, such as those on how older adults define friendship mentioned above, gerontologists have researched how older adults feel about their friends and what they do with and for them. Information About Friendship Hintergrund ist die Einrichtung eines zweiten Datenzentrums (weitere Informationen). Friends. Friendship book is a book in which children's friends write their personal details and answer fun questions about themselves – such as name, likes, what they want. May 15, - All friendships are unique. friendships are unique. Friendship Quotes, Stock Photos, Unique, Beautiful, Friend More information Article by. Nov 16, - Keychain with friendship message, the key ring is additionally decorated with a heart on a small carabiner. ❤ Our followers More information. Der Job ist jedoch in Paris. Sie vereinigen sich am südlichsten Punkt. Die Beziehung scheiterte daran, dass David beruflich nach Minsk zog, nachdem Phoebe ihn Streatgame schweren Herzens gehen lassen, da sie wusste, dass er nur so seine Karriere als Physiker weiter bringen konnte. FIPS :. Er versucht ständig, seine eigene Unsicherheit durch Witze und ironische Parship Preise Angebote zu überspielen. Insgesamt wurde die Serie mal für den Emmy nominiert. Sie hat einen zwanghaften Reinlichkeits- Ordnungs- und Putzfimmel und ist oft übertrieben ehrgeizig. Der italienischstämmige Katholik kann durch seine Intelligenz nicht gerade überzeugen, wohl aber durch seinen Charme. In der neunten Staffel lernt sie durch ein Blind Date Mike kennen, mit Geh Aufs Ganze Spiel sie in der gleichen Staffel noch zusammenziehen will. Seit Beginn seiner Karriere hat sie Joey betreut. Sie wird jedoch den Sohn Ben mit ihrer Lebensgefährtin Susan erziehen. Zur letzten Sendung am 6. Unterdessen What Is A Betting Exchange die freundschaftliche Beziehung zwischen Rachel und Joey, bei dem sie wohnt, immer enger Thai Tip Joey verliebt sich in sie. Max Payne Online Ende der dritten Staffel versucht Chandler, Monica zu überzeugen, dass sie gut zusammenpassen würden. Er wohnt bei seinen Müttern, hat aber ein sehr gutes Verhältnis zu seinem Vater und dessen Freunden.

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Unter Phoebes Namen hat sie einige Pornos gedreht. Chandlers Mutter, die eine erfolgreiche Autorin von anrüchigen Liebesromanen ist und in einer Folge den verzweifelten Ross Empire Online Spielen. Ross ist während der Serie dreimal verheiratet. In vielen anderen Bereichen sei Friends hingegen sehr Casino Tiger. Es gibt keine medizinischen Einrichtungen oder Krankenhäuser in Friendship. Als er acht Jahre später wieder zurückkommt, ist Phoebe mit Mike liiert, doch als die beiden sich trennen, kommt David wieder mit Phoebe zusammen. Janice kommt in jeder Fragen Wwm zehn Staffeln vor. Er erscheint jedoch in Begleitung seiner neuen Freundin Julie, sodass es nun Rachel ist, die Handy Aufladen Paypal mehrere Folgen Ross ihre Gefühle verschweigt, woraufhin die beiden dann aber doch zusammenkommen. Rachel löst versehentlich ein Feuer in dieser Wohnung aus, und deshalb muss Phoebe als Gast bei Monica Dresscode Casino Las Vegas.

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Write an essay on friendship -- Short essay on friendship in english

Adults with strong social support have a reduced risk of many significant health problems, including depression, high blood pressure and an unhealthy body mass index BMI.

Studies have even found that older adults with a rich social life are likely to live longer than their peers with fewer connections.

Many adults find it hard to develop new friendships or keep up existing friendships. Friendships may take a back seat to other priorities, such as work or caring for children or aging parents.

You and your friends may have grown apart due to changes in your lives or interests. Or maybe you've moved to a new community and haven't yet found a way to meet people.

Developing and maintaining good friendships takes effort. The enjoyment and comfort friendship can provide, however, makes the investment worthwhile.

Quality counts more than quantity. While it's good to cultivate a diverse network of friends and acquaintances, you also want to nurture a few truly close friends who will be there for you through thick and thin.

It's possible that you've overlooked potential friends who are already in your social network. Think through people you've interacted with — even very casually — who made a positive impression.

If anyone stands out in your memory as someone you'd like to know better, reach out. Ask mutual friends or acquaintances to share the person's contact information, or — even better — to reintroduce the two of you with a text, email or in-person visit.

Extend an invitation to coffee or lunch. To meet new people who might become your friends, you have to go to places where others are gathered.

Don't limit yourself to one strategy for meeting people. The broader your efforts, the greater your likelihood of success. Persistence also matters.

Take the initiative rather than waiting for invitations to come your way, and keep trying. You may need to suggest plans a few times before you can tell if your interest in a new friend is mutual.

Above all, stay positive. You may not become friends with everyone you meet, but maintaining a friendly attitude and demeanor can help you improve the relationships in your life and sow the seeds of friendship with new acquaintances.

Joining a chat group or online community might help you make or maintain connections and relieve loneliness.

However, research suggests that use of social networking sites doesn't necessarily translate to a larger offline network or closer offline relationships with network members.

In addition, remember to exercise caution when sharing personal information or arranging an activity with someone you've only met online. Developing and maintaining healthy friendships involves give-and-take.

Sometimes you're the one giving support, and other times you're on the receiving end. Letting friends know you care about them and appreciate them can help strengthen your bond.

It's as important for you to be a good friend as it is to surround yourself with good friends. Manage your nerves with mindfulness. You may find yourself imagining the worst of social situations, and feel tempted to stay home.

Use mindfulness exercises to reshape your thinking. Each time you imagine the worst, pay attention to how often the embarrassing situations you're afraid of actually take place.

As noted in the 3rd paragraph of Section 1. Whiting argues that such an approach fails properly to make sense of the idea that I love my friend for her sake.

Moreover, Whiting argues, to understand my concern for her for her sake in terms of my concern for things for my sake raises the question of how to understand this latter concern.

It should be clear that Whiting does not merely claim that friends share values only in that these values happen to coincide; if that were the case, her conception of friendship would be vulnerable to the charge that the friends really are not concerned for each other but merely for the intrinsically valuable properties that each exemplifies.

Such a commitment on my part is clearly a commitment to her, and a relationship characterized by such a commitment on both sides is one that consistently and non-accidentally reinforces the sharing of these values.

For similar criticisms, see Jeske It is only in terms of the significance of the historical relationship, Brink argues, that we can make sense of the reasons for friendship and for the concern and activity friendship demands as being agent-relative and so in this way personal rather than agent-neutral or impersonal, as for Whiting.

To be directed by your friend is to allow her interests, values, etc. Thus, your friend may admire your tenacity a trait you did not realize you had , or be amused by your excessive concern for fairness, and you may come as a result to develop a new understanding of yourself, and potentially change yourself, in direct response to his interpretation of you.

It is a bit unclear what your role is in being thus directed and interpreted by your friend. Is it a matter of merely passively accepting the direction and interpretation?

Yet this would seem to be a matter of ceding your autonomy to your friend, and that is surely not what they intend. Rather, it seems, we are at least selective in the ways in which we allow our friends to direct and interpret us, and we can resist other directions and interpretations.

However, this raises the question of why we allow any such direction and interpretation. One answer would be because we recognize the independent value of the interests of our friends, or that we recognize the truth of their interpretations of us.

But this would not explain the role of friendship in such direction and interpretation, for we might just as easily accept such direction and interpretation from a mentor or possibly even a stranger.

This shortcoming might push us to understanding our receptivity to direction and interpretation not in dispositional terms but rather in normative terms: other things being equal, we ought to accept direction and interpretation from our friends precisely because they are our friends.

And this might push us to a still stronger conception of intimacy, of the sharing of values, in terms of which we can understand why friendship grounds these norms.

Unlike similar accounts, Sherman explicitly includes pride and shame as emotions I sympathetically feel on behalf of my friend—a significant addition because of the role pride and shame have in constituting our sense of ourselves and even our identities Taylor Thus, as she summarizes a passage in Aristotle b11—12 :.

Rather, the values are shared in the sense that they are most fundamentally their values, at which they jointly arrive by deliberating together.

The intent of this account, in which what gets shared is, we might say, an identity that the friends have in common, is not to be descriptively accurate of particular friendships; it is rather to provide a kind of ideal that actual friendships at best only approximate.

Like the union view of love, this account of friendship raises worries about autonomy. Even so, much would need to be done to spell out this view satisfactorily.

In each of these accounts of the kind of intimacy and commitment that are characteristic of friendship, we might ask about the conditions under which friendship can properly be dissolved.

Thus, insofar as friendship involves some such commitment, we cannot just give up on our friends for no reason at all; nor, it seems, should our commitment be unconditional, binding on us come what may.

Understanding more clearly when it is proper to break off a friendship, or allow it to lapse, may well shed light on the kind of commitment and intimacy that is characteristic of friendship; nonetheless, this issue gets scant attention in the literature.

A final common thread in philosophical accounts of friendship is shared activity. The background intuition is this: never to share activity with someone and in this way to interact with him is not to have the kind of relationship with him that could be called friendship, even if you each care for the other for his sake.

Rather, friends engage in joint pursuits, in part motivated by the friendship itself. These joint pursuits can include not only such things as making something together, playing together, and talking together, but also pursuits that essentially involve shared experiences, such as going to the opera together.

Rather, the activity must be pursued in part for the purpose of doing it together with my friend, and this is the point of saying that the shared activity must be motivated, at least in part, by the friendship itself.

And this generally seems to be the case: for example, Thomas , , , , who argues for a weak conception of intimacy in terms of mutual self-disclosure, has little place for shared activity in his account of friendship, whereas Sherman , who argues for a strong conception of intimacy in terms of shared values, deliberation, and thought, provides within friendship a central place not just to isolated shared activities but, more significantly, to a shared life.

Nonetheless, within the literature on friendship the notion of shared or joint activity is taken for granted: not much thought has been given to articulating clearly the sense in which friends share their activity.

This means in part that a particular theory of friendship might be criticized in terms of the way in which its account of the intimacy of friendship yields a poor account of the sense in which activity is shared.

For example, one might think that we must distinguish between activity we engage in together in part out of my concern for someone I love, and activity we share insofar as we engage in it at least partly for the sake of sharing it; only the latter, it might be argued, is the sort of shared activity constitutive of the relationship of friendship as opposed to that constitutive merely of my concern for him see Nozick Consequently, according to this line of thought, any account of the intimacy of friendship that fails to understand the sharing of interests in such a way as to make sense of this distinction ought to be rejected.

Helm develops an account of shared activity and shared valuing at least partly with an eye to understanding friendship. He argues that the sense in which friends share activity is not the sort of shared intention and plural subjecthood discussed in literature on shared intention within social philosophy on which, see Tuomela , ; Gilbert , , ; Searle ; and Bratman , for such sharing of intentions does not involve the requisite intimacy of friendship.

Friendships emerge, Helm claims, when the friends form a plural agent that cares positively about their relationship, and the variety of kinds of friendships there can be, including friendships of pleasure, utility, and virtue, are to be understood in terms of the particular way in which they jointly understand their relationship to be something they care about—as tennis buddies or as life partners, for example.

Friendship clearly plays an important role in our lives; to a large extent, the various accounts of friendship aim at identifying and clarifying that role.

In this context, it is important to understand not only why friendship can be valuable, but also what justifies particular friendships. What makes friendship worthwhile for me, and so how ought I to evaluate whether particular friendships I have are good friendships or not?

One sort of answer is that friendship is instrumentally good. Moreover, she claims, friendship is pleasant in itself as well as useful to the friends.

Annis adds that it helps promote self-esteem, which is good both instrumentally and for its own sake. Cooper b , interpreting Aristotle, provides two arguments for why this might be so.

Hence, a flourishing life is possible only through the epistemic access friendship provides. Such activities include moral and intellectual activities, activities in which it is often difficult to sustain interest without being tempted to act otherwise.

Friendship, and the shared values and shared activities it essentially involves, is needed to reinforce our intellectual and practical understanding of such activities as worthwhile in spite of their difficulty and the ever present possibility that our interest in pursuing them will flag.

Consequently, the shared activity of friendship is partly constitutive of human flourishing. So far these are attempts to understand the value of friendship to the individual in terms of the way friendship contributes, instrumentally or constitutively, to something else that is valuable to the individual.

Yet one might also think that friendship is valuable for its own sake. Indeed, we ought to expect that fleshing out this claim would involve a substantive proposal concerning the nature of that community and how it can have a separate federated?

Friedman existence and value. Once again, the literature on shared intention and plural subjecthood is relevant here; see, for example, Gilbert , , ; Tuomela , ; Searle ; and Bratman A question closely related to this question of the value of friendship is that of what justifies my being friends with this person rather than with someone else or no one at all.

To a certain extent, answers to the question of the value of friendship might seem to provide answers to the question of the justification of friendship.

After all, if the value of friendship in general lies in the way it contributes either instrumentally or constitutively to a flourishing life for me, then it might seem that I can justify particular friendships in light of the extent to which they contribute to my flourishing.

Nonetheless, this seems unacceptable because it suggests—what is surely false—that friends are fungible. To be fungible is to be replaceable by a relevantly similar object without any loss of value.

That is, if my friend has certain properties including, perhaps, relational properties in virtue of which I am justified in having her as my friend because it is in virtue of those properties that she contributes to my flourishing , then on this view I would be equally justified in being friends with anyone else having relevantly similar properties, and so I would have no reason not to replace my current friend with someone else of this sort.

This is surely objectionable as an understanding of friendship. In solving this problem of fungibility, philosophers have typically focused on features of the historical relationship of friendship cf.

Brink , quoted above. If my friend and I form a kind of union in virtue of our having a shared conception of how to live that is forged and maintained through a particular history of interaction and sharing of our lives, and if my sense of my values and identity therefore depends on these being most fundamentally our values and identity, then it is simply not possible to substitute another person for my friend without loss.

For this other person could not possibly share the relevant properties of my friend, namely her historical relationship with me.

However, the price of this solution to the problem of fungibility, as it arises both for friendship and for love, is the worry about autonomy raised towards the end of Section 1.

An alternative solution is to understand these historical, relational properties of my friend to be more directly relevant to the justification of our friendship.

Thus, Whiting distinguishes the reasons we have for initiating a friendship which are, she thinks, impersonal in a way that allows for fungibility from the reasons we have for sustaining a friendship; the latter, she suggests, are to be found in the history of concern we have for each other.

However, it is unclear how the historical-relational properties can provide any additional justification for friendship beyond that provided by thinking about the value of friendship in general, which does not solve the fungibility problem.

It is not clear how the appeal to historical properties of my friend or our friendship can provide an answer. In part the trouble here arises from tacit preconceptions concerning the nature of justification.

Solving the problem, it might therefore seem, requires somehow overcoming this preconception concerning justification—a task which no one has attempted in the literature on friendship.

For further discussion of this problem of fungibility as it arises in the context of love, as well as discussion of a related problem concerning whether the object rather than the grounds of love is a particular person or a type of person, see Section 6 of the entry on love.

Another way to construe the question of the value of friendship is in more social terms: what is the good to society of having its members engaged in relationships of friendship?

For similar claims, see Annis These answers to the social value of friendship seem to apply equally well to love: insofar as love essentially involves both a concern for your beloved for his sake and, consequently, action on his behalf for his sake, love will exhibit the same social value.

Friedman , however, argues that friendship itself is socially valuable in a way that love is not. Understanding the intimacy of friendship in terms of the sharing of values, Friedman notes that friendship can involve the mutual support of, in particular, unconventional values, which can be an important stimulus to moral progress within a community.

Consequently, the institution of friendship is valuable not just to the individuals but also to the community as a whole. A growing body of research since the mids questions the relationship between the phenomenon of friendship and particular moral theories.

At the root of these questions concerning the relationship between friendship and morality is the idea that friendship involves special duties : duties for specific people that arise out of the relationship of friendship.

Thus, it seems that we have obligations to aid and support our friends that go well beyond those we have to help strangers because they are our friends, much like we parents have special duties to aid and support our children because they are our children.

Given this, the question arises as to what the relationship is between such special duties of friendship and other duties, in particular moral duties: can our obligations to our friends sometimes trump our moral duties, or must we always subordinate our personal relationships to morality in order to be properly impartial as, it might be thought, morality demands?

Such moral schizophrenia, Stocker argues, prevents us in general from harmonizing our moral reasons and our motives, and it does so in a way that destroys the very possibility of our having and sustaining friendships with others.

Roman Society. Among the Romans, cicero held a position analogous to that of Aristotle among the Greeks as their principal theorist of friendship.

Less profound than Aristotle, perhaps, he made up for this by the charm and warmth of his treatment.

He based his notion of friendship on the instinct for sociability that is found in man, defining it as a perfect agreement of wills, tastes, and thoughts accompanied by benevolence and affection.

Nothing, in his estimation, is more adapted to human nature than this type of accord. Other goods such as riches, health, power, and honor are uncertain and defectible; only friendship is really enduring, because it is based upon virtue.

It can be found only among good men, for they alone have the loyalty and integrity to sustain it and lack the cupidity and passion that destroy it.

True friendship is not easily found, he admits; but once found, it is forever. The reason why true friendships are rare, for Cicero, is that few are worthy of being loved in and for themselves and many seek to make friends purely for pleasure or for profit.

A true friend must be another self; thus if one desires to find friends, he must become good himself and then seek out someone similar.

Cicero saw friendship as an aid to virtue, since good people who are benevolent to each other become masters of their passions and preserve virtue in one another.

This explains why Cicero insisted that one should choose his friends well, for a failure of judgment could cause one to become attached to a person who would later do him harm, and then would not be a true friend.

Later Centuries. The thoughts of Aristotle and Cicero on the subject of friendship have remained classic. They passed on to the Fathers of the Church, such as St.

They thus constitute a heritage that has become traditional in the Western world. Modern psychologists have complemented their doctrines on points of detail, and philosophers have subjected them to searching analyses, but neither have contradicted them in their essential elements.

Systematic Analysis. With this historical background, it becomes possible to present an analysis of the concept of friendship that describes its psychological characteristics, its metaphysical nature, and its moral aspect.

Psychological Characteristics. Friendship is first of all an attraction; seen externally, its principal effect is one of dynamism, for friends seek one another out and are not happy unless they are together.

When proximity is spatially impossible, the attraction manifests itself by the one's turning his thoughts and desires to the other.

It is because a man loves his friend that he is attracted to him in various ways. This emotion is more interior than exterior, and one senses it without always being able to see it; yet it is occasionally discernible, sometimes by gestures, sometimes by smiles or even by tears.

Third, friendship is a reciprocal affection. This explains why inanimate things cannot be friends or the object of friendship; a man may love wine, but wine cannot be his friend.

Again, the reciprocity involved in friendship explains why it grows and deepens with each return of affection, for it involves a type of psychological resonance based on the phenomenon of love's provoking more love in ever-increasing proportions.

Fourth, friendship is a union of a spiritual kind. There are reciprocal affective responses even at the level of brute animals, and yet one does not speak of these as friendship.

What is peculiar to friendship is its concern with the intellectual life, not with the life of sense. Its activity has a certain independence from matter, and it provokes a spiritual union, i.

This is why Aristotle could maintain that friendship can exist only between persons. Fifth, friendship is a disinterested type of relationship.

Persons may voluntarily associate for a variety of reasons, such as for profit or for pleasure; but what these associations have in common is that they promote the interest of the one entering into them.

The peculiar association that is friendship is more noble and ideal than these, for it sets aside personal gain and, in this sense, is disinterested.

The true friend is such because of the qualities he finds in the other; this explains why he will make sacrifices for his friend and do things with no thought of what he himself gets out of them.

This also explains why friendship has a lasting character, for monetary and sensual interests are subject to frequent change, whereas the virtuous qualities that attract a friend are stable and enduring.

Finally, perfect friendship is a fusion of souls. Spiritual and disinterested relationships can be more or less intimate, but at their best they encompass all the activities of the souls engaging in them.

The effect of this perfect friendship, in the expression of Aristotle and Augustine Conf. Metaphysical Nature. Friendship manifests itself by its acts, but such acts presuppose the reality that is friendship just as volition presupposes the will and judgment presupposes the intellect.

This reality is not a power or faculty of the soul, because it is not inborn in man; rather it involves an acquired disposition, a habit, that exists in man's rational appetitive faculty, or will.

This habit is actualized, as Aquinas teaches, when one friend "informs" the affection of the other. As henry of ghent and richard of middleton observed, however, habits of this type must exist in each person involved in the friendship, and thus the habits themselves must be numerically distinct.

The reality that is friendship must therefore be a relation that is based on two absolute habits; one may refer to each habit as friendship in the person participating in it, but the notion is not complete unless it includes the relationship that unites one habit to the other.

Thomas Aquinas and other theologians who study friendship in the context of man's relationship with God generally speak of it as a kind of love; they see the "love of friendship" as the highest form of love, and oppose it to the "love of concupiscence" Summa theologiae 1a2ae, From this viewpoint, one may define friendship as a love of benevolence, something held in common and based on the mutual regard of its participants.

Lower forms of love are at the level of sense; they seek pleasure and self-gratification, and this is true even of the sexual love whereby man is prompted to conserve his species see sex.

The love of friendship, on the other hand, is of a higher order; it is essentially spiritual, and thus serves well to explain the optimum relationship that unites man to God see charity.

Moral Aspect. Friendship as such is good, and therefore is legitimate for man. It is, in fact, beneficial for his soul: the companion of virtue, it may itself be considered as a virtue in the one possessing it.

Yet it places demands on those who embrace it, and in certain circumstances, particularly when too restrictive, can be harmful and even vicious.

For a fuller discussion, particularly as related to the spiritual life, see friendship, particular. Role in Christianity.

The fact of being a Christian in no way changes man's nature or his needs. It is thus possible for Christians, while living a supernatural life, to have purely human friendships among themselves.

There is nothing distinctively Christian about such friendships, however, unless Christianity in some way enters into the relationships and transposes them to a higher level.

Some have seen an opposition between the teaching of the pagans on friendship and the New Law given to men by Jesus Christ. For example, Jesus prescribes charity toward man's neighbor, and this independently of one's particular feelings and personal likes or dislikes.

Such a prescription seems to deprive friendship of its proper character; for, rather than seek something selective and personal, the Christian is urged to a universal attitude of love toward all men, and this by obligation rather than by free choice.

Thus the pagan ideal of friendship seems to be absorbed in charity, and itself destroyed in the process. Again, the perfection of the love of God, as conceived by such spiritual writers as St.

There is some element of truth in these considerations, but at the same time it is possible to oppose them by others that argue for the basic compatibility between friendship and charity.

For one, Christianity has focused attention on the dignity of the individual independent of his place in society; it has liberated man more from matter by accenting the immortality of his soul.

Such a liberation can only favor friendship, for it provides the basis for greater personal appreciation of one's fellow men.

Much the same can be said for the teaching on the universality of the Redemption, for this too proclaims the equality of all souls in God's sight.

Finally, by the gift of supernatural life, Christianity has made numberless human souls incomparably better and therefore more worthy of love; it has increased their resemblance to one another and has thus provided a new basis of community among them.

De facto, friendship does exist among Christians. It has never flourished so much as it has since the promulgation of the gospel, nor has it ever been so pure and so noble in its practice and its ideals.

Bibliography: g. Docrine et histoire , ed. Paris — — Paris Theorists generally conceptualize "friendship" as a voluntary relationship between equals.

This definition of friendship is an abstract conceptualization rather than a description of reality. As Graham Allan observed, in Western society there are no formal rules about who should be friends, but people generally establish relationships with others who are similar to them in terms of race, gender, class, religion, education, and so forth.

Although friendships are generally more voluntary than relationships with family and neighbors, this tendency for people to be similar to their friends suggests that there are constraints on friendship choice that are not obvious to the participants.

If no hidden rules about what types of friendships are appropriate or desirable existed, friendship patterns would exhibit more variation.

Similarly, the statement that friendships are egalitarian is a theoretical rather than an empirical observation. Older adults define friendship differently than theorists do.

Adams, Blieszner, and De Vries found that older adults tend to define friendships in terms of the concrete behaviors involved such as self-disclosure, sociability, day-today assistance, and shared activities.

Many of them also define friendship cognitively in terms of loyalty, trustworthiness, and shared interests.

Not all older adults conceptualize friendship in the same way, however. For example, Paul Wright described women's friendships as face-to-face and men's as side-by-side and concluded that older women emphasize the emotional qualities of friendship.

In contrast, older men mention indirect indicators of shared friendship activities such as frequency of contact or length of acquaintance.

Lawrence Weiss and Marjorie Lowenthal reported on another source of variation, stage of life course; older adults perceive more complexity than younger people.

Most of the research on adult friendship has been conducted since the early s. Early studies focused on the number of friends people had and how much time they spent with them.

More recently researchers have shifted their focus to the study of other aspects of friendship structure such as what proportion of people's friends know each other, whether the friends treat each other as equals, and whether they are demographically similar to each other, to dimensions of friendship process such as feelings, thoughts and behaviors involved in a relationship, and finally to the variation in both friendship structure and process across contexts.

As Adams and Allan discussed elsewhere, these changes in foci reflect the realization that friendships are complex and that they vary tremendously depending on the network, community, and society in which they are formed and maintained.

Gerontologists have examined friendship processes more closely than they have examined friendship structure. In addition to the studies of what people think about their friends, such as those on how older adults define friendship mentioned above, gerontologists have researched how older adults feel about their friends and what they do with and for them.

For example, some researchers have reported that older adults feel more satisfied with their friendships when the favors they do for their friends are reciprocated, but Karen Roberto and Jean Scott found that reciprocity was less important among close friends than among casual ones.

This finding has implications for the durability of friendships as people age and can no longer help others as much as they could when they were younger.

Most of the research on older friendship, however, has focused on what friends do together, such as sharing companionship, communicating with each other, and especially helping each other.

Eugene Litwak noted that in contrast to family members who help older adults with tasks that require long-term commitment, friends are more likely to help older adults with shorter-term tasks or events that they share in common.

For example, the friends of older adults might help them adjust to widowhood, make a decision about when to retire, and decide whether to relocate, whereas family members might nurse older adults with chronic physical problems or manage their finances.

The difference in the ways which friends and family members may help older adults may have implications for the welfare of older adults without families.

The research findings on the structural features of older adult friendships are much less conclusive than those about its processes. More research has been conducted on the size of older adult friendship networks and how similar friends are to each other than how likely the friends of an older adult are to know each other.

Power and status differentials between older adults and their friends have not been studied at all. Each study of friendship reports a slightly different average number of friends for older adults.

Some of the variation in findings can be attributed to differences in the contexts in which older adults live. For example, researchers commonly report that institutionalized older adults report fewer friends than those who live independently.

Differences in the demographic composition of the populations studied also contribute to varied results. For example, like many other researchers, Claude Fisher and Stacey Oliker reported that older men have fewer friends than older women.

This suggests that researchers who study samples of older adults in which women are overrepresented will report more friends on the average.

The age composition of the sample also affects the average number of friends reported. Many early studies reported that the older adults were, the fewer friends they had.

Given these findings, one would expect researchers who study populations in which the average age is high to report a smaller number of friends than those who study younger populations.

It would be a mistake, however, to assume that a loss of friends with age is inevitable, universal, and linear, because other researchers such as Colleen Johnson and Lillian Troll and more recently Dorothy Jerrome and Clare Wenger, have demonstrated that some people continue to add new friends to their networks as they age.

The findings regarding the similarity of older adults and their friends and the proportion of the friends of older adults who knew each other also vary by study.

It is clear, however, for older adults as well as for people of other ages, that the characteristics of a contest affect the characteristics of the networks embedded within it.

For example, Pearl Dykstra and others have reported that during old age the proportion of women's friends who are women is higher than the proportion of men's friends who are men.

Although this gender difference exists in all age groups, it is larger in old age, probably because women live longer and thus more of them are available to be friends.

The tendency to form relationships with people who are similar to them and the relatively low proportion of men who reach old age suggests that men may be at a disadvantage in establishing new friendships and women may have difficulty developing a diverse network.

As Litwak observed, a diverse friendship network is desirable because different types of friends have access to different resources and can help older adults in varied ways.

Studies of the proportion of an older adult's friends who know each other also illustrate the importance of contextual effects. Comparing results in studies of different contexts reveals that the friends of older adults in nursing homes are more likely to know one another than the friends of older adults in age-segregated housing, and that friends of older adults in age-segregated housing are more likely to know one another then the friends living in age-integrated community settings Blieszner and Adams.

The proportion of people's friends who know each other has implications for the types of help they can seek from them. Consider a situation in which an older woman expects to be bedridden for a substantial period of time.

If a high proportion of her friends know one another, only one phone call may be necessary to activate a helping network. If, however, her friends do not know each other, then a whole series of phone calls may be necessary.

In contrast, imagine an older man with a secret to share. If his friends all know each other, he may worry gossip will spread. If his friends do not know each other, he can be confident that his story will not be retold to anyone who matters to him.

Studies have suggested that friendships contribute to physical health and longevity, possibly because friendship and happiness are associated with each other.

Since the s when Majorie Lowenthal and Clayton Haven demonstrated that having a confidante was important to older adult mental health, or certainly since the s when Reed Larson summarized the clear connection between friendship activity and psychological well-being, gerontologists have assumed that friendship has positive consequences for older adults.

The connection between friendship activity and psychological well-being is one of the most frequently reported findings in the social gerontology literature.

Nonetheless, it is not clear whether friendship leads to happiness or happiness leads to friendship, because researchers have not studied multiple groups born at different times repeatedly as they age.

It is only recently that researchers have begun to compare the friendship patterns among older adults of various ages and to examine friendship patterns over time see Field, for a discussion of some of these studies.

It is also not clear how consistently friendship activity and happiness are related to each other in different cultures, because cross-cultural research on older adult friendship has been and is still rare.

Until longitudinal studies of multiple cohorts in different contexts have been conducted, the consequences of friendship will be implicit rather than explicit.

Adams, R. Placing Friendship In Context. Cambridge, U. Allan, G. Dykstra, P. Next of Non kin. Amsterdam : Swets and Zeitlinger, Field, D.

Fischer, C. Jerrome, D. Johnson, C. Larson, R. Litwak, E. Helping the Elderly. New York : Guilford, Lowenthal, M. Roberto, K. Weiss, L.

Edited by M. Thurner, D. Chiriboga, and others. San Francisco : Jossey-Bass, Pages 48 — Wright, P. Adams, Rebecca G.

Discussions of the experience and the value of friendship, construed primarily in male terms, pervade Western cultural and literary tradition.

The late-twentieth-century feminist reassessment of the uniqueness and significance of female friendship stimulated a variety of empirical investigations of the characteristics and function of friendship in contemporary society as well as several social historical examinations of the nature of past friendships.

The latter work yielded two major new insights: the recognition that friendship is a socially constructed, historical phenomenon, mediated by the dominant emotional culture and various social and structural factors in a particular period — gender socialization, for example — and the recognition that friends have played a variety of important, and sometimes central, roles in the lives of both women and men.

Recent social scientific studies indicate that friendship also plays a significant role in children's lives from birth to adolescence.

While social relations within the family constitute a major component of the social environments of children, peer relations, including friendships, represent another important context for socialization.

Psychologists have observed friendships between infants as young as eight or ten months. By the age of three, the development of social skills creates a wide range of friendship possibilities, and by the age of five, children can pretend and play creatively.

Between the ages of seven and twelve, friends still function as playmates, but they also provide mutual respect and affirmation.

In adolescence, as in adulthood, female friendship involves a major component of trust and personal disclosure.

As children's social groups expand to include more than one "best" friend or a small, informal circle of close friends, their friends may be drawn from organized peer groups such as school classes, athletic teams, special interest clubs, scout troops, or gangs.

Such groups also comprised significant social environments for nineteenth-and twentieth-century children. Factors such as access to schooling, period of compulsory schooling, length of school day, school size, diversity versus homogeneity of student body, and urban or suburban setting shaped children's social worlds and thus influenced their friendship patterns in the past.

The modern history of friendship must deal with the growing importance of schooling as a bastion of friendship and a need for friends.

Increasingly precise age-grading within schools has had a strong effect on the range of children's friendships. However, data concerning children's actual interactions with one another are not readily available for the historian who seeks to trace change and continuity in those patterns.

Some historians argue that the high proportion of childhood deaths in the premodern Western world conditioned children not to invest emotionally in their playmates, but we know very little about childhood friendship prior to the eighteenth century.

The presence of large numbers of siblings also affected friendships outside the family. As with the history of childhood more generally, accessible sources of information about children's friendships from the eighteenth century on primarily reflect the point of view of middle-class adults.

For example, child-rearing manuals, children's books, travelers' accounts, and the diaries and correspondence of parents document middle-class standards and cultural prescriptions and expectations for children's friendships.

Yet these sources reveal little regarding either children's actual friendship practices and experiences in small, face-to-face groups or their feelings about their friends.

Direct information concerning the dynamics of young children's friendships is particularly difficult to find, but sources such as autograph books, photographs, diaries, journals, and letters can offer insight into the experiences and feelings of older children and adolescents.

Autobiographic recollections can also provide data about individuals' childhood friendships, albeit through the filter of memory.

Despite the limitations of the available sources and the absence of a fully developed historical perspective on friendship in general, the outlines of a history of this aspect of childhood experience are beginning to emerge.

Late-eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century Western culture promoted the development of strong female friendships. Didactic and prescriptive middle-class literature emphasized affiliation as opposed to achievement as the appropriate focus for women's lives and assigned them a subordinate place in the social hierarchy.

Shared religious, educational, biological, and domestic experiences created powerful bonds between women and constructed a world of intimacy and support that distanced them from their male relatives.

Victorian emotional standards, which began to take shape in the s, also fostered close friendships, particularly through an emphasis on intense family love that extended into friendship.

Middle-class, nineteenth-century families often discouraged daughters from playing with boys, although some preadolescent girls chose boys as companions.

Nevertheless, most young girls, surrounded by models of intimate adult female friendship and exposed to periodical literature that romanticized such relationships, typically replicated them in their own lives, sometimes choosing cousins or sisters as their closest friends.

The rise of educational institutions for girls provided an important setting for the development of close friendships. From the middle of the eighteenth century, middle-class young women interacted with each other in boarding schools, female academies, and seminaries where they formed intimate, often lifelong relationships.

Affectionate language and suggestions of physical intimacy pervade the correspondence of nineteenth-century school friends and highlight the central role of friendship in their lives.

In the early twentieth century, the enrollment of growing numbers of girls in junior high and high schools provided additional opportunities for peer interaction and friendship.

Like their predecessors, adolescent girls in the first two decades of the twentieth century expressed affection for friends, shared confidences, and relied on one another for emotional support.

However, this period marks the beginning of a transition to different expectations and priorities with less emphasis on female intimacy. A new emotional culture stressed emotional restraint, and an explicit cultural preference for heterosexual relations stigmatized same-sex intimacy.

These influences discouraged emotional intensity and closeness between female friends. Preadolescent girls were encouraged to go to parties and dances and to talk to boys.

By the s, ten year olds were worrying about being popular with boys. This distinctly new heterosexual imperative also dominated high school relationships, as the content of female friendships increasingly focused on boys and dating, and young women's friendship choices often explicitly reflected their efforts to be perceived as members of the right group of girls to insure popularity with the opposite sex.

Although late-twentieth-century feminism re-emphasized the value and importance of female friendship, the impact of this ideology on young girls and adolescents is not clear.

Several current studies describe a culture of aggression, backstabbing, and exclusive cliques among junior and senior high school girls, suggesting that friendship is fraught with problems for young women in contemporary society.

While these descriptions of mean, calculating, and devious young women may be unrepresentative or exaggerated, they invite further study in the context of the history of children's friendships.

Prior to the nineteenth century, boys spent more time in the company of adults than with their peers. As soon as they were old enough, they helped their fathers with farm work or served as apprentices or servants in other families.

Certainly they had opportunities to play, but the structure of their lives offered limited occasions for independent activities out of the presence of adults, and hence for building friendships.

This situation changed as urbanization and longer periods spent in school exposed them to larger groups of peers on a regular basis.

In this context, boys developed a distinctive peer culture in which friendship played an important role. Unlike those of girls, the friendships of young boys were unstable and superficial.

Boys played outdoors, roaming more freely than their sisters were permitted to do. They chose their friends, often cousins and neighbors, pragmatically, more by availability than by any feelings of special affinity.

Their relationships emphasized loyalty and good companionship rather than intimate confidences. Boys made friends easily, but conflict and rivalry were integral to their culture.

Hence, their friendships shifted regularly, and fights between gangs from different neighborhoods, villages, or social classes were common.

Frequently friends, as well as rivals, engaged in physical combat, such as boxing matches. Numerous informal clubs that met in attics and basements brought boys together for athletic and other activities.

Because these groups typically excluded certain individuals from membership, they actually promoted division as well as unity and companionship among boys.

Nineteenth-century boyhood ended in the mid-or late teens when young men typically left home to find a job or pursue further education.

In this period of transition, often referred to by historians as youth, friendships became stronger. Individuals relied on peers for reassurance as they entered a new stage of life.

Formal, self-created youth organizations first appeared in the late eighteenth century as descendants of earlier apprentice societies, and they proliferated.

These groups — literary and debate clubs, religious societies, secret societies, fraternities, and lodges — provided a setting in which young men often found one or more close friends.

In contrast to boyhood relationships, these new friendships displayed qualities similar to those of adolescent young women's friendships — intimacy, sharing of thoughts and emotions, expressions of affection, and physical closeness.

However, while many nineteenth-century women maintained such friendships throughout their lives, intense male attachments ended as young men reached manhood and took on the responsibilities of marriage and careers.

As in the case of young women's relationships, the stigmatization of homosexuality in late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century society and the post-Victorian emphasis on emotional restraint discouraged intimacy in young men's friendships.

Affectionate male relationships disappeared as a new pattern of interpersonal distance between young men emerged in response to the fear of being labeled homosexual.

Despite social criticism of this pattern in the context of concerns about the personal isolation experienced by late-twentieth-century boys and young men, and some efforts toward male bonding among adults, homophobic social pressures continue to influence the nature of male friendship from childhood through adulthood.

Glen H. Elder Jr. New York : Cambridge University Press. MacLeod, Anne Scott. Paula S. Fass and Mary Ann Mason. Rosenzweig, Linda W.

Rotundo, Anthony E. Simmons, Rachel. New York: Harcourt. Smith-Rosenberg, Carroll. Carroll Smith Rosenberg. New York: Alfred A. New York: Ballantine Books.

Wiseman, Rosalind. New York: Crown. Yacovone, Donald. Laura McCall and Donald Yacovone. But modern moral philosophy from the mid-eighteenth century to the later part of the twentieth century largely overlooked the role of friendship in moral life, in part because of the dominance of the impartialist stance of utilitarian and Kantian moral theory.

Those theories also influenced the study of Aristotelian ethics. In the late s and early s, this trend shifted, in part due to a confluence of causes — renewed interest in Aristotelian ethics for its own sake, the development of modern virtue ethics , and the rise of feminist ethical theory.

A seminal article by John Cooper on Aristotelian friendship helped to make Aristotle's account accessible, and especially emphasized the role of friendship in a morally reflective life.

Aristotle's account remains the locus classicus for understanding the nature of friendship and its place in the moral life; however, before turning to that account, some background is important for understanding its resuscitation in the contemporary moral debate.

From a classical utilitarian view, in the broad tradition of Jeremy Bentham — , an agent is obligated to do that which promotes maximally desired outcomes for the greatest number of people, irrespective of standing commitments to friends and family or other personal projects and pursuits.

One is to view oneself as a causal lever, Bernard Williams charged, of optimal outcomes. Thus, if one can save one's spouse or the next inventor of a cure for AIDS, one may be obligated, on a strict utility theory, to save the latter over the former.

Rule utilitarians try to counter the unwelcome result, arguing that a general rule or practice of taking care of kith and kin is an overall best way of promoting general welfare.

But a strict act utilitarian that is, one committed to assessing the overall good consequences produced by discrete acts cannot consistently make this response.

From a Kantian view, drawn primarily from Immanuel Kant 's early work The Groundwork from the Metaphysic of Morals , motives of friendship may be acted upon in morally permissible ways when properly constrained by the impartial point of view of the Categorical Imperative.

But even then, such motives, like those of sympathy or other inclinations, lack intrinsic moral worth of their own. So, to adapt a well-known example from Michael Stocker on a Kantian view, one acts in a morally worthy way when one visits a hospitalized friend not out of friendship, but out of duty.

In later writings, Kant seems to soften his view, arguing that acting from friendship may be an important way of realizing the more general, obligatory end of beneficence.

Still, Kant is ever wary that intimacy can undermine mutual respect; thus, friendship, is a constant teeter-totter between getting close and keeping at bay: "For we can regard love as attraction and respect as repulsion, and if the principle of love commands friends to come together, the principle of respect requires them to keep each other at a proper distance" , p.

The difficulty of fitting friendship squarely into modern moral theory led many to return to Aristotle's account.

This renewal of interest coincides with a feminist push to take seriously the role of interpersonal relationships and caring in a moral point of view.

In particular, the influential work by psychologist Carol Gilligan galvanized philosophers of various stripes to begin to look at friendship and attachment relations as important arenas of moral agency and moral development.

Thus, in a sense, the renewed interest in friendship brought with it a rediscovery of the kind of moral psychology that is an integral part of ancient ethics.

The framing question of Aristotelian ethics, like that of most ancient ethics, is what constitutes flourishing or happiness eudaimonia for human beings?

Aristotle's answer is that happiness is a composite of virtuous activity and external goods; chief among those external goods is the relational good of friendship, or philia.

Humans are by nature "social creatures," Aristotle says, and self-sufficiency is always relational. Even if it turned out that the kind of virtuous or excellent activity most fitting for humans was contemplative and not civic or practical, people would still contemplate best in the company of others NE a According to Aristotle's definition, philia is a mutually acknowledged reciprocation of affection and good will on the basis of some ongoing specific interest, such as pleasure, utility, or virtue.

Chosen friendship grounded in virtue or good character is the paradigmatic and most stable form of friendship.

It is a friendship dedicated to the whole person and committed to the joint project of good living. The best sort of friends "live together" and "spend their days together," not as cattle grazing the same pasture, but "by sharing in argument and thought" NE b11 — Given the intensity of these ideal friendships, one can reasonably expect to cultivate only a few at a given time.

There is much good sense in these views: People are attracted to others on the basis of common pursuits and affinities and show mutual practical concern and good will within the context of the friendship.